Within the article (second page) one concept I had never heard of before caught my eye:
What explains the Federal Circuit's relentless pro-patent bias? One obvious theory is what economists call "regulatory capture": the theory that over time, public officials will come to identify with the interest groups they are supposed to be supervising. The theory is usually applied to regulatory agencies in the executive branch (think FCC commissioners becoming Comcast lobbyists), but the theory seems to fit the Federal Circuit as well.That is to say that the very judges who judge patent cases have become over long exposure (often as patent lawyers) to a patent-heavy culture more committed to enforcing existing patents, thus causing the massive proliferation of patents. You are much more likely, says Lee, to patent something if you think it has a good chance of being upheld down the line when you file a claim.
The concept of growing to support the thing you regulate because you come to identify with it I think is fascinating and I will be on the look out for this idea in the future.
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